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Abstract 
   This analysis clarifies the ambiguous results from military spending and economic growth literature where the 
impact of military expenditure is frequently found to be non-significant or negative. Investigation re-examines 
effects of military spending on growth by analysing this relationship contingent on initial income per capita 
using recent advances in panel estimation methods and unique dataset on military expenditure. The findings 
reveal that while growth falls with higher levels of military spending, the marginal impact of military spending 
is increasing in initial income levels. In contrast to previous findings from the literature, this increase is 
consistent across different income groups and type of economies, and monotonic in direction going towards 
zero for sufficiently higher income level countries. 
      
Keywords: Military expenditure; Economic Growth; Contingency 
JEL classification: H56; O11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Andrew Mountford and Jonathan Temple for helpful comments 
and suggestions.  
E-mail address: Vusal.Musayev.2009@live.rhul.ac.uk 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The economic effects of military spending continue to be the subject of considerable debate, 
with a lack of consensus in the literature. How does military expenditure affect a country’s 
economic growth? And how do these effects vary across economies? These are important 
questions, as the effects of military spending, on one hand, may just represent a budgetary 
burden which is necessitated by a country’s need for some level of security; on the other 
hand, it may also serve for growth by delivering significant “peace dividends” and attract 
additional revenues into a country’s budget through defence industry (e.g., arm trading, 
technology transfers).      
This investigation makes a contribution to the debate on the economic effects of military 
spending, in light of the ambiguous outcomes found in the military spending and economic 
growth literature, by reassessing the relationship contingent on the level of initial income per 
capita. Although growth falls with higher levels of military spending, the results reveal that 
conditional on the values of other independent variables, the marginal impact of military 
spending is increasing in initial income levels. In particular, this relationship is negative and 
significant amongst poor countries, while typically not significantly different from zero 
amongst richer countries. In contrast to previous research, this contingency pattern continues 
to hold under an alternative modelling strategy in which the data set is stratified into different 
income categories and types of economies, as well as its robustness along several dimensions; 
and is monotonic in direction, converging towards zero for sufficiently high income level 
countries, which explains the ambiguity in previous findings. 
The debate regarding the economic effects of military spending is founded in the contribution 
of Benoit (1973, 1978) which ignited a subsequent tranche of research employing a variety of 
econometric models, reflecting different theoretical perspectives. Keynesian, neoclassical and 
structuralist models were applied using a variety of specifications, econometric estimators 
and types of sample in cross-sectional, time-series or panel datasets. The diversity of results 
led to arguments for case studies of individual countries and relatively homogeneous groups 
of countries. However, the literature has not reached a consensus. For instance, Dunne and 
Uye (2009) in a survey of 102 studies on the economic effects of military spending, report 
that almost 39% of the cross-country studies and 35% of the case studies find a negative 
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effect of military spending on growth, with around 20% finding positive impacts for both 
types of studies.
1
 
Clearly military spending, conflict and economic capacity (education, governance, 
institutions and resource endowments), all interact to influence growth. However all the 
interactions of these channels and their influence on economic growth will vary on the 
countries under examination and depend on their economic/budgetary constraints. For 
example, a relatively advanced developing country, such as one of the “Asian Tigers” by 
investing into military sector will have interests over the industrial impact of its involvement 
in arms production, the technology and the foreign direct investment benefits vs. the 
opportunity costs, while a poorer African economy may be more concerned with the conflict 
trap it finds itself in, i.e. investing into military sector instead of directing budgetary sources 
into welfare-improving purposes is likely to be more detrimental in poorer countries.  
A simple illustration of how the impact of military spending on economic growth can vary 
conditional on countries’ income level, presented in Figure 1, indeed provides support for this 
view also casting some doubt on the desirability of pooling all the nations together in the 
econometric analysis without taking into account the military spending contingency through 
income.
2
 The plots illustrate significant negative impact of military expenditure on growth for 
                                                          
1
 Previous surveys of the military spending and growth literature also include Chan (1987), who found a lack of 
consistency in the results; Ram (2003) who reviewed 29 studies, concluding that there is little evidence of a 
positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also difficult to say that the evidence supported a 
negative effect. Dunne (1996, chap. 23) covering 54 studies concluded that military spending had at best no 
effect on growth and was likely to have a negative effect; and Smith (2000) concluded that the large literature 
did not indicate any robust empirical regularity, positive or negative, though he suggested there is a small 
negative effect in the long run. Smaldone (2006) in his review of Africa, considers military spending 
relationship to be heterogeneous, but feels that variations can be explained by intervening variables. The effect 
can be both positive and negative but are usually not pronounced, although the negative effects tend to be wider 
and deeper in Africa and most severe in countries experiencing legitimacy/security crisis and 
economic/budgetary constraints. 
2
 Scatter plots and fitted relationships between the variables of interest for four income groups are achieved 
using partial regressions which are obtained in two stages. First, both the dependent variable and the isolated 
independent variable are projected onto the additional set of regressors under consideration. Next, the fitted 
dependent variable is regressed against the fitted independent variable. In each case, the residuals of a growth 
regression on a set of variables are compared with the residuals of military expenditure regression on the same 
variables. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions where growth and military expenditure is 
related linearly. 
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the low income subsample, while this effect becomes less and less negative going towards 
zero for relatively richer countries, perhaps reflecting a contradictory effect induced by 
positive income effects gained as peace dividends which cancel the detrimental effects out.
3
  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The methodology and data employed are 
described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the estimation results using more formal analysis 
which confirm the presence of the contingency that plots above illustrate, as well as its 
robustness along several dimensions; and Section 4 concludes. 
2.1. Empirical Methodology 
Many different estimators have been used to examine the relationship between growth and 
military spending, with associated advantages and disadvantages to each method. This 
section begins with a brief discussion of these estimators in order to motivate the approach to 
estimation analysis. Then the discussion turns to the method used to explore the potential 
contingencies in the relationship between military expenditure and growth. 
Letting the subscripts i and t represent country and time period respectively, the estimated 
growth model with introduction of military expenditure can be written as  
                                yit – yi(t-1) =  α yi(t−1) + θ1milit +  β'Zit + μt + ξi + εit                                 (1) 
where y is log of real per capita income, milit is military spending, Zit is a vector of additional 
control variables, μt is a period-specific constant, ξi is an unobserved country-specific effect, 
and εit is an error term.
4
  
                                                          
3
 Dunne and Tian (2013) also demonstrates that the impact of military expenditure on growth is heterogeneous 
when countries are stratified into different income groups. Military spending appears to have been more 
damaging for poorer countries, however showing non-monotonic change in the behaviour when moving to 
higher income distribution (see also Dunne, 2012). 
4
 The analysis employs standard growth model with introduction of military expenditure which is similar to the 
benchmark specification used by Aizenman and Glick (2006). As discussed in Dunne et al. (2005), taking into 
account the theoretical weaknesses generated by the Feder-Ram or Solow model, the extended Barro model 
used by Aizenman and Glick (2006) has comparative advantage to explain both military expenditure and 
growth. Here, the analysis does not purport to test these theoretical models; rather working in the tradition of 
cross-country growth literature, the investigation presents empirical evidence of the existence of a contingent 
relationship between military expenditure and growth. 
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As discussed in Caselli et al. (1996), the consistency of OLS estimators depends on the 
assumption that the country-specific effect ξi is orthogonal to other right-hand side variables. 
This assumption in growth regressions is clearly violated due to the presence of lagged 
income as an explanatory variable: i.e. E[yi(t-1)ξi] ≠ 0. Thus, a first step to achieve consistent 
estimates starts by eliminating the country-specific term. 
One approach to eliminate ξi is using a fixed effects estimator or the closely-related between-
effect estimator that involves the implementation of a country-specific constant term. Another 
approach instead introduces the implementation of a country-specific random variable that is 
uncorrelated with the included regressors and may be realized using random-effects 
estimation or seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (see Greene, 2003, for details regarding 
these estimators). These strategies deal successfully with estimation inconsistencies generated 
by non-orthogonality between explanatory variables and country-specific effects but, as 
Caselli et al. (1996) note, inconsistencies will continue to be problematic if the explanatory 
variables are not strictly exogenous. 
To deal with inconsistency and likely endogeneity issues, Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed a GMM difference estimator that is derived by taking first differences of all 
variables, and uses lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments. However, as 
discussed in Easterly and Levine (2001), the difference estimator has the statistical 
shortcoming that if regressors are persistent, then lagged levels of explanatory variables are 
weak instruments. Further, taking differences of the original level equation reduces the time 
dimension of the sample and leaves information about the level relationship between 
explanatory variables and growth unused. An additional complication associated with the 
estimation in differences involves potential measurement errors associated with the 
explanatory variables.
5
 
To overcome these issues, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed a system GMM estimator that combines the differenced model with the levels 
                                                          
5
 Hauk and Wacziarg (2004) have studied the impact of measurement error on the performance of the estimators 
discussed, explicitly in the context of the growth regressions. They conclude the following: In the presence of 
measurement error, fixed-effects and difference estimators tend to underestimate the coefficient of lagged 
income and parameter values associated with the additional explanatory variables. In contrast, the cross-
sectional OLS estimator and the panel SUR estimator both tend to provide relatively accurate estimates of 
lagged income, while overestimating the magnitude of parameters associated with the additional explanatory 
variables.  
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model. However, it should be noted that the move from the difference to the systems 
estimator also involves a cost: the adoption of additional assumptions regarding orthogonality 
between the country-specific effect and the regressors, which are difficult to justify a priori. 
Lacking clear guidance regarding the choice of estimators, the analysis follows Easterly and 
Levine (2001) (see also DeJong and Ripoll, 2006) and report results obtained from several 
alternative estimators: cross-section OLS, SUR, Fixed effects, Difference and Systems 
GMM.
6
 For the additional sensitivity analysis Systems GMM is the preferred estimator. 
The treatment of each regressor according to their exogeneity levels under the GMM 
estimators is based on upper and lower bound conditions (Roodman, 2006). To ensure that 
the estimated effect is not driven by the number of instruments, the analysis also employs the 
“1 lag restriction” technique followed by Roodman (2009) that uses only certain lags instead 
of all available lags as instruments.
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As an additional robustness check, to identify potential outlier countries that might affect the 
estimation results, the analysis employs a strategy advocated by Belsley et al. (1980). It 
involves the application of the DFITS statistic to flag the countries associated with high 
combinations of residual and leverage statistics.   
Turning to the method used to capture potential contingencies in the relationship between 
military expenditure and growth, two approaches are employed. Under the first, the baseline 
approach involves including in (1) additional explanatory variable constructed as the product 
of military expenditure and log of initial income. The hypothesis is that the direct impact of 
                                                          
6
 In addition to these estimates, between-effects and random effects estimates were calculated but are not 
reported, because, as characterized above, the between-effects estimator is closely related to the OLS estimator 
and the random-effects estimator is closely related to the SUR estimator, and therefore the results obtained using 
these additional estimators are quantitatively similar to those reported here. Moreover, the fixed-effects 
estimator and the difference GMM estimator leads to quantitatively similar results as well, however both 
estimators are reported since a large body of research analyses in the defence literature is based on these 
estimators. 
7
 Along with coefficient estimates obtained using GMM estimators, tables also report three tests of the validity 
of identifying assumptions they entail: Hansen’s (1982) J test of over-identification; and Arellano and Bond’s 
(1991) AR(1) and AR(2) tests in first differences. AR (1) test is of the null hypothesis of no first-order serial 
correlation, which can be rejected under the identifying assumption that εit is not serially correlated; and AR (2) 
test is of the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation, which should not be rejected. In addition, to 
deal with heteroskedasticity, the Windmeijer (2005) small-sample correction is applied. 
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military spending is negative, while marginal impact is increasing in income levels implying 
that the effect of military expenditure becomes less negative at higher levels of income. The 
second approach involves stratifying the data set into different subsamples; and separate 
specifications of (1) are estimated, where growth linearly responds to the changes in military 
expenditure. Therefore four income groups are defined: high income (rank 4) countries; 
upper-middle income (rank 3) countries; lower-middle income (rank 2) countries; and low-
income (rank 1) countries.
8
 Analysis of these relationships demonstrates that evidence of a 
significant interaction term effect arises by monotonic changes in the impact of military 
expenditure on growth across different subsamples.   
2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis is based on a balanced dynamic panel dataset that consists of 89 countries over 
the 1970-2010 period.
9
 The panel dataset is constructed by transforming time series data into 
non-overlapping five year averages. This procedure smoothes out short-run cyclical 
fluctuations thereby helping the analysis to concentrate on long-run growth effects (Knight et 
al., 1996). The dependent variable is logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
constructed using data from the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.1). Log of initial income per 
capita is used as regressor. 
Military spending is measured as the average ratio of military expenditures to GDP, using 
data collected from the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Yearbooks. 
As online data tables relate only to the period from 1988 onwards, military expenditure 
shares for the previous periods are collected and inputted directly from the SIPRI Yearbooks 
in order to extend the time horizon.
10
  
                                                          
8
 The cut-off levels of income rankings are taken as in DeJong and Ripoll (2006), where country classifications 
are obtained by mapping classification thresholds as defined by the World Bank’s income measures into the 
corresponding Penn World income measures. The resulting definitions are as follows: high-income level 
countries are those with real per capita GDP above $11,500; upper-middle income level countries those between 
$5,500 and $11,499; lower-middle income level countries are between $2,650 and $5,499; and low-income level 
countries those with less than $2,650. Note that the classifications during the analysis are based on 1970 income 
rankings. 
9
 See Appendix Tables A and B for the list of countries and descriptive statistics. 
10
 Data on military spending was initially collected starting from the period of 1959 as the PWT data on real 
GDP per capita is not available for most countries before this date. However, given the trade off between having 
longer time series dimension and losing cross-country sample observations for which data on all variables is 
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Along with numerous advantages of having longer time horizon, the access to military data 
before 1990 period facilitates to investigate whether the ambiguous findings in the literature 
are driven by the changes in the nature of conflicts after the post-Cold War era. As discussed 
in Kaldor (1999), the end of proxy-wars and superpower involvement in local wars did not 
reduce the number of conflicts, but did reduce the intensity of military battles. There are 
fewer real military battles than in the past, but attacks on civilians increased showing a 
dominance of civil or intra-state conflict. 
The investigation also uses a standard set of control variables typically employed in the 
empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro and Lee, 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, Ch. 
12). It includes two proxies for human capital: the log of average years of schooling attained 
by males aged 15 and over, obtained from Barro and Lee data set, and the log of life 
expectancy, as reported by the United Nations; and also population growth rate,
11
 real private 
investment as a percentage of real GDP and degree of economic openness, all as reported in 
the Penn World Tables (PWT 7.1). 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for military expenditure share and growth over different 
income groups. Two aspects of these statistics are of particular interest in the analysis. The 
first is the tendency that relatively richer countries tend to enjoy relatively rapid growth. 
Average growth rates increase monotonically when moving from the lower to higher income 
classifications: from 1.473% (s.d. 2.136) for low-income countries to 2.095% (s.d. 0.442) for 
high-income countries. The second aspect of these statistics is that relatively rich countries 
tend to spend relatively more on the military sector. The average military expenditure share 
tends to increase when moving from the low to high income classifications (with the 
exception of the upper-middle income group): from 2.637% (s.d. 1.782) to 3.297% (s.d. 
3.128).  
3. Empirical Results 
Figure 2 illustrates how the relationship between military spending and economic growth is 
contingent on the level of income. A positive relationship between growth and the interaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
available, the analysis was constrained to the period of 1970 and onwards, yielding the balanced sample of 89 
countries. 
11
 Growth rate of population employed in the analysis is computed as log of n + g + δ, where n is average 
population growth rate; g is the rate of technical progress and δ is the rate of depreciation of the stock of 
physical capital investment and g + δ is assumed to be equal to 0.05, following Mankiw et al. (1992). 
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term indicates that the marginal impact of military expenditure on growth is increasing in 
initial income. In turn, military expenditure significantly decreases growth in the low- and 
lower-middle income subsample, while this effect is positive, albeit insignificant, in the 
upper-middle and high-income subsample. Taking the evidence from Figure 2 (see also 
Figure 1) as preliminary, it is of interest to confirm the presence of the contingency that these 
figures illustrate using more formal analysis.  
Estimation results for the impact of military expenditure contingent on initial per capita 
income are presented in Tables 2-9. Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from a non-
linear estimation. Table 3 displays the estimation results using the alternative specification, 
where the relationship is estimated linearly using low-half and high-half income subsamples 
of the data. Table 4 runs the same exercise using the four income rankings, while Table 5 
examines the linear relationship between military spending and growth for a relatively 
homogenous group of countries. Table 6 and 7 examine the sensitivity of the estimates of the 
variables of interest to the presence in the data of several alternative subsets of countries, 
singled out for certain unusual aspects of their growth rate experiences and military 
expenditure shares. Table 8 exercises the contingency relationship for different time 
windows. Finally, Table 9 uses alternative measures for income and military spending as 
additional robustness check.   
3.1. Military Spending and Growth Contingencies  
While not reported in the tables, a discussion of the global relationship observed between 
military spending and growth excluding the military expenditure and initial income 
interaction term from the baseline specification is pertinent. Using the full sample, a 
moderate negative relationship is estimated, and the estimated impact on growth of one 
percentage point increase in military expenditure is approximately -0.04 percentage points 
(the significance of the coefficient estimates exhibits sensitivity to the particular estimator 
being employed).  
Inclusion of contingencies into the model, as reported in Table 2, demonstrates that the 
negative relationship is evident only among relatively poor countries, and a positive sign for 
the interaction term is obtained in all cases. In contrast to the cross-sectional OLS, panel 
10 
 
estimators demonstrate significant impact of both linear and non-linear terms in all cases 
when the outliers are removed.
12
 
Splitting the data set into subsamples as reported in Table 3, one including low- and lower-
middle income countries, the other including upper-middle and high-income countries, and 
estimating separate linear specifications for each yields results which are, in general, 
consistent with the findings from Table 2. For the low and lower-middle subsample, the 
military expenditure coefficients are all estimated as negative and in most cases significant. 
For the upper-middle and high-income subsample, a mixed picture emerges: the estimates 
oscillate between positive and negative values and rarely differ significantly from zero (in 8 
cases out of 10).
13
 Regarding quantitative significance, using the estimates produced by the 
systems estimator, the impact on growth of one percentage point increase in military 
expenditure is estimated as -0.133 percentage points among low- and lower-middle income 
countries, and -0.002 percentage points among upper-middle and high-income countries.
14
  
A similar picture emerges when the four income rankings are considered. There is a notable 
difference across the estimates when investigation moves from the poorest countries to the 
richest.
15
 For the poorest countries, those with index values of 1, all fourteen sets of 
quantitative-significance estimates are negative, showing high significance in most cases. 
Regarding quantitative significance, using the estimates produced by the systems estimator 
(Panel B, column b in Table 4), the impact on growth of one percentage point increase in 
military expenditure is estimated as -0.130 percentage points among the income rank 1 
countries. This finding reveals that the significant impact from military spending for the low-
half income distribution is mainly driven by the poorest economies.  For the relatively richer 
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 Note that over-identification test condition is not satisfied for GMM difference (column b).  
13
 Note that the condition of second-order serial correlation for GMM difference (column b) is violated for 
upper-middle and high-income countries. Therefore, the only estimator that demonstrates a significant impact of 
military expenditure for the high-half subsample is the fixed effects model.  
14
 These measures are obtained by dividing the coefficient estimates by the time span between income 
observations (5 years). 
15
 The test of the equality of the military expenditure estimates for the poorest and the richest countries produced 
by the systems estimator (Panel B, column b in Table 4) rejects the null that the impact is the same. 
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countries, the impact of military expenditure becomes less and less negative, converging 
towards zero.
16
 
In a further effort to investigate whether this heterogeneity for military spending effects is 
somehow different across marginal changes throughout subsamples, Figure 3 plots the 
estimated coefficients of military expenditure along with their relative confidence bands (at 
95% level) for infra-marginal changes in income levels where each interval are selected so to 
maintain the same distance between the lower and upper bounds for each interval. The results 
are supportive with the evidence above confirming monotonic increase in military spending 
effects when moving from lower to higher income level economies.   
The results from splitting the countries into more homogenous groups according to their 
economic and geographical characteristics, and estimating separate linear specifications for 
each group reveal essentially the same story. The negative effect of military spending is 
estimated to be wider, deeper and robustly significant for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries (see also e.g., Smaldone, 2006; Hamid, 
2012). Interestingly, it turns out that the elimination of Iran, Israel and Jordan from the 
MENA subsample alters the significance of the military expenditure estimates. This result 
can be explained by the high demand for security in these countries, and the non-linear 
impact of military spending when a country is faced with high threat (see Aizenman and 
Glick, 2006). Another interesting feature worth to mention here is that significant positive 
effect from military spending for East Asia and the Pacific region countries is driven by big 
arm producers like China and “Asian Tigers” countries, and becomes insignificant when 
these countries are removed from the subsample. Overall, these results demonstrate that the 
negative and significant impact from military expenditure across countries is mainly the case 
for SSA and MENA region where for the rest of the subgroups the results are mixed, with the 
estimates varying in sign and rarely demonstrating a robust significant impact.
17
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 For the richest countries in the world, the significance of military expenditure under GMM difference is not 
robust when using the “1 lag restriction” technique. Therefore, the only estimator that demonstrates a significant 
impact of military expenditure is the fixed effects model out of the five estimators (see Panel B in Table 4). Note 
that this was also the case for high-half subsample in Table 3. This might suggest that some caution should be 
taken when employing the fixed effects or GMM difference estimators in the military spending and growth 
analysis.     
17
 The estimated impact of military expenditure does not differ significantly from zero in 11 cases out of 14 for 
Advanced Economies and East Asia and Pacific; and in 12 cases for Latin America and Caribbean subsample. 
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Thus, the results from Tables 3-5 imply that the contingency pattern from modelling military 
spending and growth as shown in Table 2 is robust and continues to hold under alternative 
sample splitting methodologies. All in all, these findings suggest that a negative and 
significant relationship is only apparent among poor economies, and illustrates a typically 
insignificant impact among relatively richer economies. Moreover, the behaviour of this 
pattern is monotonic in direction, converging towards zero for sufficiently high income level 
countries, which therefore explains the ambiguity in findings from previous research.      
Coefficient estimates of additional explanatory variables enter mostly with the expected 
signs. Estimated coefficients on lagged income and the investment ratio are, respectively, 
negative and positive, statistically significant, and typically indicate strong quantitative 
effects. Life expectancy also exhibits a strong relationship with growth. The negative impact 
of trade openness is mainly driven by low-half income distribution countries, where a 
positive sign is apparent only among upper-middle and high-income countries (see also 
DeJong and Ripoll, 2006). Surprisingly, schooling exhibits a negative relationship with 
growth when interaction term is employed; but this effect disappears when alternative sample 
splitting strategies are considered. Finally, the estimated effect of population growth is mostly 
negative and typically insignificant. 
3.2. Robustness Checks  
Beyond the robustness checks as described above, special attention is paid to the potential 
influence on the results of several subsets of countries. The first collection of subsets features 
countries singled out on the basis of certain unusual aspects of their growth rate experiences 
during the time period spanned by the sample. Results of this exercise are reported in Table 6 
for three subsets of countries. For each subset, Table 6 reports the list of countries, their 1970 
and 2005 income rankings, their average military expenditure shares and growth rates 
measured over the entire sample period, and the coefficient estimates obtained for the 
military spending and its interaction with initial income given their removal from the sample 
in addition to outlier countries. Only estimates obtained using systems estimator are reported, 
but the general flavour of the exercise is consistent across estimators. For ease of comparison, 
the estimates obtained given the exclusion of the four outlier countries, as in Table 2 (column 
b), are also reported. The additional subsets of countries singled out on the basis of unusual 
aspects of their growth rate experiences include the twelve escapees from the low-income 
13 
 
group, the sixteen escapees from the low and lower-middle income group, and the Asian 
Tigers.  
Strikingly, the coefficient estimates change very little given the removal of any one of the 
subsets under consideration; and in all cases, enter significantly at conventional levels. For 
both the linear and non-linear terms of military expenditure, the estimates obtained given the 
removal of each subsample lie within one standard deviation of the full-sample estimate.     
The second collection of subsets includes countries singled out due to the maintenance of 
high shares of military expenditure in addition to outlier countries. Three subsets are 
considered: the two low-income and the two high-income countries with the highest military 
expenditure shares specified as those with military spending levels above the top decile; and 
the union of these two subsets. The impact of removing these subsets of countries is reported 
in Table 7. Once again, point estimates change very little. What does change somewhat is 
statistical significance in the case when the exclusion of the second and the third subsets are 
employed. However, the general pattern of results reported in Table 2 remains apparent given 
the exclusion of these countries from the sample. 
Collectively, the results from Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the contingency relationship 
between military expenditure and growth does not seem attributable to the influence of a 
small number of exceptional countries. 
Using time effects in all regressions controls for any common factor that could affect all 
countries in any five-year interval. However, it is of interest to check if the results hold when 
different time windows are used for the estimation. A sensitive issue is that the post-Cold 
War era led to important changes in the nature of conflicts by reducing the intensity of real 
military battles than in the past, and whether these changes from the period after the end of 
Cold-War alter the results (Kaldor, 1999). The baseline time span in the analysis is 1970-
2010. Table 8 considers more restrictive information available for three successive periods of 
minimum 20 years: 1970-1995; 1980-2010; 1990-2010. The result holds significantly in the 
first and third periods but not in the second (significant only at 18% level), suggesting that 
the findings from contingency relationship between military expenditure and growth are also 
robust when the analysis is restricted to the post-Cold War era. Overall, the general pattern of 
results reported in Table 2 remains apparent under alternative restrictions of the dataset to 
different time windows. 
14 
 
Table 9 presents the robustness test using alternative income and military expenditure 
measures. As discussed in Johnson et al. (2013), using PWT income data can be problematic 
and affect cross-country growth estimates because of variability across different versions of 
the PWT. Although using low-frequency data is robust to these inconsistencies in data 
revisions, as a check on results, column 1 employs GDP per capita from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) as an alternative income measure. Column 2 instead uses an alternative 
approach to capture potential contingencies in the relationship between military spending and 
growth by replacing the product of lagged income and military expenditure with an 
alternative one: the product of military expenditure and 1970 income rankings which takes 
values 1 (for the poorest income countries) to 4 (for the richest countries). Column 3 employs 
the World Bank data as an alternative source for military expenditure share instead of 
SIPRI.
18
 In all three cases, the main results hold.
19
  
Overall, the sensitivity results provide supportive evidence of a contingent relationship 
between military expenditure and growth conditional on initial income levels.  
4. Conclusion 
The empirical analysis shed light on the rationale behind ambiguous outcomes from previous 
research by reassessing the relationship between military spending and growth contingent on 
a country’s economic and budgetary constraints. The findings have revealed the presence of a 
significant interaction effect under which the marginal impact of military expenditure on 
growth is increasing in initial income. In particular, investigation finds that while growth falls 
with higher levels of military spending among the world’s poor countries, the impact of 
military expenditure on growth becomes less and less negative as a country becomes richer, 
and this contingency pattern is monotonic in direction, going towards zero for less budgetary 
constrained countries. 
The analysis suggests a number of paths for future research concerning the effect of military 
activity on economic growth through income. A particularly promising avenue of future 
research would be to analyze the role of the existence of a defence industry in a country. 
                                                          
18
 Note that employing the World Bank measure of military expenditure share restricts the data set to 1990-2010 
period. 
19
 Separate linear relationship of military expenditure and growth is also estimated using WDI income data for 
low-half and high-half income subsamples and four income rankings. The results are qualitatively similar to that 
presented here.   
15 
 
Specifically, it is of interest to see whether the difference in the impact of military 
expenditure across income groups is driven by arm trading, i.e. export of military production 
which might offset the detrimental impact of military expenditure by attracting more income 
revenues. 
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Figure 1: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, log of population growth, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness 
and schooling, and time fixed effects. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions, excluding outliers as defined in Table 4. 
 
Figure 2: Partial Regression Plots for Military Expenditure and Growth 
 
 
Note: The set of regressors includes log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of 
openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. Partial regression plot for interaction term also includes military expenditure into 
specification. The figures are produced using OLS panel regressions, excluding outliers as defined in Tables 2 and 3. 
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Figure 3: Military Expenditure Effects by Infra-Marginal Changes in Income Levels 
 
 
Note: The graph plots the estimated impact of military spending on growth conditional on infra-marginal changes in income levels. The 
infra-marginal intervals are selected so to maintain the same distance between the lower and upper bounds for each interval. The set of 
regressors also includes log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and 
schooling, and time fixed effects. Black spikes represent 95% confidence bands; the vertical line corresponds to the threshold line between 
low and high-half income level countries. Red line represents local polynomial smoothed trend for the impact of military spending on 
growth when moving from lower to higher income categories. The method of estimation is the panel least squares with robust standard 
errors. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Growth and Military Expenditure  
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Sample split Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Full sample Mil. exp. 89 2.789 2.189 0.281 14.964 
 Growth 89 1.730 1.709 -5.338 6.900 
Low income Mil. exp. 44 2.637 1.782 0.281 9.049 
 
Growth 44 1.473 2.136 -5.338 6.900 
Lower-middle Mil. exp. 16 3.026 2.385 0.933 11.247 
 Growth 16 1.787 1.427 -0.678 5.467 
Upper-middle Mil. exp. 11 2.219 1.526 0.364 4.693 
 
Growth 11 2.078 1.425 0.502 5.272 
High income Mil. exp. 18 3.297 3.128 1.067 14.964 
 Growth 18 2.095 0.442 1.086 2.798 
Lower Mid./Low Mil. exp. 60 2.740 1.947 0.281 11.247 
 
Growth 60 1.557 1.965 -5.338 6.900 
High/Upper-Mid. Mil. exp. 29 2.888 2.656 0.364 14.964 
 Growth 29 2.089 0.918 0.502 5.272 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on cross country averages for the 1970-2010 period. 
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Table 2 
Non-linear Specifications of Military Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
 OLS SUR Fixed effects Difference GMM System GMM 
 a b a b a b a b a b 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.010*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.029*** 
(0.004) 
-0.029*** 
(0.005) 
-0.044** 
(0.018) 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
Mil. exp/GDP -0.354 
(0.572) 
-0.505 
(0.430) 
-1.396*** 
(0.269) 
-1.816*** 
(0.294) 
-2.199*** 
(0.376) 
-2.649*** 
(0.398) 
-1.282 
(0.788) 
[0.107] 
-1.782* 
(0.895) 
-2.094 
(1.446) 
[0.151] 
-3.021** 
(1.444) 
Mil*GDP 0.038 
(0.060) 
0.053 
(0.045) 
0.149*** 
(0.032) 
0.191*** 
(0.034) 
0.243*** 
(0.049) 
0.286*** 
(0.050) 
0.135 
(0.090) 
[0.138] 
0.177* 
(0.099) 
0.225 
(0.161) 
[0.164] 
0.322** 
(0.157) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.016 
(0.015) 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.007) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.019 
(0.012) 
-0.032*** 
(0.012) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.069** 
(0.027) 
0.073*** 
(0.019) 
0.093*** 
(0.012) 
0.093*** 
(0.013) 
0.055*** 
(0.019) 
0.052** 
(0.021) 
0.090 
(0.072) 
0.042 
(0.106) 
0.130*** 
(0.040) 
0.166*** 
(0.058) 
Investment/GDP 0.082*** 
(0.029) 
0.052*** 
(0.019) 
0.106*** 
(0.013) 
0.094*** 
(0.013) 
0.161*** 
(0.019) 
0.162*** 
(0.019) 
0.152*** 
(0.039) 
0.132** 
(0.051) 
0.248*** 
(0.047) 
0.251*** 
(0.056) 
Openness (log) -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.014* 
(0.007) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.009* 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.039* 
(0.021) 
-0.036 
(0.025) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.020* 
(0.011) 
Observations 89 85 695 665 695 665 601 575 695 665 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test:       0.772 0.025 0.897 0.986 
(b) Serial Corr. Test:           
     First-order       0.008 0.075 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order       0.247 0.191 0.492 0.387 
Note: Columns “a” estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship for the full sample, while columns “b” estimate the same specification removing outliers. All estimated results for GMM estimators 
are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). The excluded countries are Botswana, China, Egypt and Singapore. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * 
represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 3 
Low-half and High-half Income Sample Splits 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
 OLS SUR Fixed effects Difference GMM System GMM 
 a b a b a b a b a b 
 Panel A: Upper-middle and High Income Sample 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
-0.039*** 
(0.009) 
-0.049*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.064** 
(0.023) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
Military exp/GDP -0.001 
(0.046) 
0.047 
(0.033) 
-0.006 
(0.043) 
0.019 
(0.030) 
-0.088 
(0.090) 
-0.101* 
(0.057) 
-0.161 
(0.104) 
-0.106** 
(0.044) 
-0.011 
(0.036) 
-0.012 
(0.050) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.009 
(0.014) 
-0.029** 
(0.011) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
0.0002 
(0.021) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
0.035 
(0.036) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.066** 
(0.025) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.053*** 
(0.018) 
0.088 
(0.059) 
0.116*** 
(0.029) 
0.121*** 
(0.043) 
0.149*** 
(0.056) 
-0.052 
(0.078) 
0.067 
(0.152) 
-0.339 
(0.332) 
0.121*** 
(0.026) 
0.279** 
(0.123) 
Investment/GDP 0.107*** 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.039) 
0.111*** 
(0.025) 
0.107*** 
(0.022) 
0.048 
(0.040) 
0.188*** 
(0.031) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.195*** 
(0.065) 
0.161** 
(0.066) 
0.320*** 
(0.051) 
Openness (log) 0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) 0.003 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.015 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.039) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
Observations 29 23 232 184 232 184 203 161 232 184 
(a) Hansen’s J Test       0.980 1.000 0.995 0.720 
(b) Serial Corr. Test  First-order      0.002 0.156 0.086 0.059 
       Second order      0.153 0.011 0.446 0.069 
 Panel B: Lower-middle and Low Income Sample 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
-0.009 
(0.036) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
Military exp/GDP -0.054 
(0.112) 
-0.099 
(0.104) 
-0.262*** 
(0.056) 
-0.385*** 
(0.074) 
-0.414*** 
(0.074) 
-0.606*** 
(0.104) 
-0.386** 
(0.180) 
-0.698** 
(0.300) 
-0.324 
(0.209) 
[0.126] 
-0.665* 
(0.341) 
Pop. growth (log) -0.035 
(0.024) 
-0.041 
(0.030) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.039***  
(0.013) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.059*** 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
0.008 
(0.038) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
0.029 
(0.044) 
Life expectancy (log) 0.065** 
(0.029) 
0.092*** 
(0.032) 
0.089*** 
(0.015) 
0.133*** 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.024) 
0.065** 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.075) 
0.021 
(0.101) 
0.105*** 
(0.030) 
0.236*** 
(0.054) 
Investment/GDP 0.069** 
(0.030) 
0.069*** 
(0.024) 
0.111*** 
(0.015) 
0.113*** 
(0.016) 
0.169*** 
(0.024) 
0.161*** 
(0.025) 
0.168*** 
(0.047) 
0.193*** 
(0.055) 
0.142*** 
(0.035) 
0.196*** 
(0.051) 
Openness (log) -0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.029 
(0.017) 
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
Schooling (log) -0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
0.009 
(0.028) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.015 
(0.011) 
Observations 60 52 463 401 463 401 398 344 463 401 
(a) Hansen’s J Test       0.995 0.270 0.994 0.996 
(b) Serial Corr. Test  First-order      0.001 0.005 0.001 0.003 
       Second order      0.740 0.419 0.520 0.669 
Note: Columns “a” and “b” estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship, respectively, with and without outliers. The estimated results for GMM estimators are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman 
(2009).  Eliminated countries from high-half income group are Argentina, Cyprus, Ireland, Iran, Mexico and Singapore, while for low-half income subsample are Botswana, Egypt, Guyana, Jordan, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia. 
The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 4 
Sample Splits for Income Rankings 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Panel A: Measures of Quantitative Significance 
Income 
group 
OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Rank 1 -0.013 
(0.116) 
-0.249*** 
(0.069) 
-0.484*** 
(0.088) 
-0.426* 
(0.236) 
-0.326** 
(0.152) 
-0.237 
(0.242) 
-0.187 
(0.332) 
Rank 2 -0.069 
(0.061) 
-0.186** 
(0.092) 
0.026 
(0.136) 
0.024 
(0.177) 
-0.194 
(0.164) 
-0.169 
(0.100) 
-0.157 
(0.096) 
Rank 3 0.065 
(0.424) 
-0.181 
(0.215) 
-0.266 
(0.349) 
-0.209 
(0.282) 
0.337 
(0.416) 
-0.181 
(0.234) 
-0.181 
(0.234) 
Rank 4 0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
-0.073 
(0.046) 
-0.084* 
(0.044) 
-0.038 
(0.081) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.027 
(0.032) 
Panel B: Measures of Quantitative Significance, Outliers Removed 
Income 
group 
OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Rank 1 -0.117 
(0.131) 
-0.448*** 
(0.082) 
-0.697*** 
(0.123) 
-0.670 
(0.410) 
[0.111] 
-0.799* 
(0.428) 
-0.473* 
(0.277) 
-0.651* 
(0.323) 
Rank 2 0.185 
(0.196) 
-0.171 
(0.168) 
-0.048 
(0.214) 
-0.048 
(0.247) 
-0.117 
(0.481) 
-0.171 
(0.119) 
-0.171 
(0.118) 
Rank 3 0.569 
(0.231) 
0.017 
(0.218) 
-0.071 
(0.354) 
-0.071 
(0.178) 
0.208 
(0.249) 
0.017 
(0.232) 
0.017 
(0.232) 
Rank 4 0.117 
(0.083) 
0.046 
(0.074) 
-0.399** 
(0.170) 
-0.356* 
(0.181) 
-0.194 
(0.239) 
0.052 
(0.102) 
0.065 
(0.104) 
Note: Columns “a” under the GMM specifications estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship using all possible lags, 
while the results in columns “b” are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications employ 
log of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed 
effects as an additional control set. The excluded countries from income rank 1 sample are Egypt, Guyana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone and Zambia; from income rank 2 are Brazil, Jordan, Korea Rep, Nicaragua and Panama; from income rank 3 are Cyprus, Iran and 
Mexico; from income rank 4 are Israel and Norway. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The number of observations in 
Panel A are 44 for OLS, 335 for SUR, FE and GMM System and 286 for GMM Difference in income rank 1 sample; 16, 128 and 112 in 
income rank 2 sample; 11, 88 and 77 in income rank 3 sample; 18, 144 and 126 in income rank4 sample. The respective figures for Panel B 
are 38, 288 and 245 in income rank 1; 11, 88 and 77 in income rank 2; 8, 64 and 56 in income rank 3; 16, 128 and 112 in income rank 4. 
***, **, * represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the 
estimates in square brackets are p-values.  
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Table 5 
Sample Splits for Different Types of Economies 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Panel A 
Estimates of Military expenditure 
 for different type of Economies 
Type of 
Economy OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Advanced 
Economies 
0.122 
(0.106) 
0.076 
(0.080) 
-0.155 
(0.172) 
-0.145 
(0.161) 
-0.206 
(0.239) 
0.088 
(0.097) 
0.099 
(0.119) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
0.009 
(0.250) 
-0.312** 
(0.154) 
-0.265 
(0.214) 
-0.226 
(0.453) 
-0.337 
(0.443) 
-0.287 
(0.202) 
-0.474* 
(0.227) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
0.108 
(0.263) 
-0.712*** 
(0.131) 
-1.059*** 
(0.151) 
-1.083** 
(0.379) 
-0.854* 
(0.458) 
-0.728 
(0.427) 
[0.101] 
-0.959** 
(0.458) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
-1.181 
(1.795) 
0.501*** 
(0.192) 
0.447 
(0.294) 
0.447 
(0.283) 
0.208 
(0.294) 
0.501** 
(0.200) 
0.501** 
(0.200) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
0.168** 
(0.003) 
-0.078 
(0.076) 
-0.171 
(0.123) 
-0.171 
(0.124) 
-0.149 
(0.133) 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
-0.078 
(0.056) 
Panel B 
Estimates of Military expenditure 
for different type of Economies, Outliers Removed 
Type of 
Economy OLS SUR 
Fixed 
effects 
Difference GMM System GMM 
a b a b 
Advanced 
Economies 
0.132 
(0.094) 
0.081 
(0.076) 
-0.394** 
(0.172) 
-0.371** 
(0.139) 
-0.627* 
(0.305) 
0.089 
(0.114) 
0.097 
(0.129) 
Latin America 
and Caribbean 
0.053 
(0.268) 
-0.147 
(0.129) 
-0.256 
(0.187) 
-0.253 
(0.171) 
-0.116 
(0.372) 
-0.148 
(0.153) 
-0.148 
(0.154) 
Sub-Saharan  
Africa 
-0.069 
(0.395) 
-1.193*** 
(0.158) 
-1.420*** 
(0.177) 
-1.538*** 
(0.188) 
-1.768*** 
(0.230) 
-1.202*** 
(0.277) 
-1.331*** 
(0.228) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
1.881 
(0.375) 
0.279 
(0.179) 
0.249 
(0.346) 
0.249 
(0.352) 
0.249 
(0.352) 
0.279 
(0.235) 
0.279 
(0.235) 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
0.063 
(0.146) 
-0.218** 
(0.090) 
-0.213* 
(0.107) 
-0.213*** 
(0.047) 
-0.213*** 
(0.047) 
-0.218*** 
(0.053) 
-0.218*** 
(0.053) 
Note: Columns “a” under the GMM specifications estimate military expenditure and economic growth relationship using all possible lags, 
while the results in columns “b” are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications employ log 
of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as 
an additional control set.  The excluded countries from Advanced Economies sample are Spain, Ireland and Portugal; from Latin America and 
the Caribbean sample - Brazil, Guyana, Nicaragua, Panama and Paraguay; from Sub-Saharan Africa sample - Botswana, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Zambia; from East Asia and the Pacific sample - China, Indonesia, Korea Rep and Papua New Guinea; 
from Middle East and North Africa sample - Iran, Israel and Jordan. The outliers are singled out using OLS regressions. The number of 
observations in Panel A are 20 for OLS, 160 for SUR, FE and GMM System and 140 for GMM Difference in Advanced Economies sample; 
19, 151 and 131 in Latin America and Caribbean sample; 26, 195 and 165 in Sub-Saharan Africa sample; 9, 69 and 60 in East Asia and the 
Pacific sample; 9, 69 and 63 in Middle East and North Africa sample. The respective figures for Panel B are 17, 136 and 119 in Advanced 
Economies sample; 14, 111 and 96 in Latin America and Caribbean sample; 20, 149 and 125 in Sub-Saharan Africa sample; 8, 40 and 35 in 
East Asia and the Pacific sample; 7, 48 and 42 in Middle East and North Africa sample. ***, **, * represent significance of estimates, 
respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates in square brackets are p-values. 
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Table 6 
Upward Movers and Asian Tigers 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Income 
rank, 1970 
Income 
rank, 2005 
Average 
Mil. exp. 
share 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 1 3 3.32 5.75 Mil.exp/GDP 
China 1 2 1.73 6.90 -3.021 1.444 0.039 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil*GDP 
Singapore 3 4 4.61 5.27 0.322 0.157 0.044 
Remove Escapees from Low Income Group 
Fiji 1 2 1.25 1.99    
Guyana 1 2 2.76 2.54    
Honduras 1 2 1.50 1.04    
Indonesia 1 2 2.34 4.19    
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil.exp/GDP 
Mauritius 1 3 0.28 2.87 -3.101 1.457 0.037 
Morocco 1 2 4.10 2.38 Mil*GDP 
Paraguay 1 2 1.35 1.44 0.331 0.157 0.039 
Sri Lanka 1 2 2.52 3.70    
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48    
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46    
Tunisia 1 2 2.10 2.60    
Remove Escapees from Low and Lower-Middle Income Group 
Algeria 2 3 2.57 1.28    
Brazil 2 3 1.52 2.29    
Chile 2 3 4.16 2.29    
Colombia 2 3 2.31 2.39    
Ecuador 2 3 2.19 1.77    
El Salvador 2 3 1.79 0.99    
Guatemala 2 3 1.13 1.51 Mil.exp/GDP 
Korea Rep. 2 4 3.85 5.47 -2.708 1.524 0.080 
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil*GDP 
Mauritius 1 3 0.28 2.87 0.287 0.164 0.085 
Panama 2 3 0.93 3.47    
Peru 2 3 3.05 1.28    
South Africa 2 3 2.63 1.38    
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46    
Turkey 2 3 4.01 2.51    
Uruguay 2 3 2.11 2.20    
Remove Asian Tigers 
Indonesia 1 2 2.34 4.19 Mil.exp/GDP 
Korea Rep. 2 4 3.85 5.47 -2.955 1.544 0.059 
Malaysia 1 3 3.73 4.01 Mil*GDP 
Thailand 1 3 2.88 4.46 0.318 0.169 0.063 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications employ log 
of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as 
an additional control set.   
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Table 7 
Exclusion of Countries with High Military Expenditure Shares 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
Country Income 
rank, 1970 
Income 
rank, 2005 
Average 
Mil. exp. 
share 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
Coeff. S. E. p value 
Remove Outliers 
Botswana 1 3 3.32 5.75 Mil.exp/GDP 
China 1 2 1.73 6.90 -3.021 1.444 0.039 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil*GDP 
Singapore 3 4 4.61 5.27 0.321 0.157 0.044 
Remove High Military Exp. Share, Low Income Countries 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 
Mil.exp/GDP 
-3.027 1.523 0.050 
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48 
Mil*GDP 
0.321 0.164 0.053 
Remove High Military Exp. Share, High Income Countries 
Israel 4 4 14.96 2.42 
Mil.exp/GDP 
-3.476 1.984 0.083 
United States 4 4 5.37 1.68 
Mil*GDP 
0.401 0.241 0.100 
Remove Both Subsets 
Egypt 1 2 8.66 3.03 Mil.exp/GDP 
Syria 1 2 9.05 1.48 -3.369 1.871 0.075 
Israel 4 4 14.96 2.42 Mil*GDP 
United States 4 4 5.37 1.68 0.375 0.225 0.099 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). All specifications employ log 
of initial income, growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects as 
an additional control set.   
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Table 8 
Different Time Windows 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: System GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 1970-1995 
(1) 
1980-2010 
(2) 
1990-2010 
(3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.018*** 
(0.006) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
Mil. exp/GDP -4.381*** 
(1.637) 
-2.217 
(1.564) 
[0.160] 
-3.216** 
(1.439) 
Mil*GDP 0.486** 
(0.189) 
0.241 
(0.176) 
[0.174] 
0.338** 
(0.156) 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 431 614 439 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.352 0.926 0.230 
(b) Serial Corr. Test:    
     First-order 0.031 0.000 0.001 
     Second-order 0.767 0.554 0.874 
Note: The estimation results are achieved using the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). Additional control set includes 
growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. ***, **, * 
represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses; the estimates 
in square brackets are p-values. 
 
 
Table 9 
Alternative Data Sources and Measurements 
Dependent Variable: Logged per capita real (Laspeyres) GDP growth 
Estimation: GMM estimation with Windmeijer (2005) Small Sample Robust Correction 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Initial GDP p.c. (log) -0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.043** 
(0.018) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
Mil. exp/GDP -2.725** 
(1.136) 
-0.470** 
(0.183) 
-5.666*** 
(1.409) 
Mil*GDP 0.386** 
(0.168) 
 0.624*** 
(0.182) 
Mil*Rank  0.117** 
(0.052) 
 
Control Set Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 688 601 342 
SPECIFICATION TESTS (p -values) 
(a) Hansen Test: 0.971 0.796 0.142 
(b) Serial Corr. Test:    
     First-order 0.000 0.015 0.000 
     Second-order 0.695 0.260 0.536 
Note: The estimation results under the columns 1 and 3 are achieved using System GMM; while under the column 2 Difference GMM is 
used. In addition, column 1 and 3 also employs the “1 lag restriction” technique following Roodman (2009). Additional control set includes 
growth rate of population, log of life expectancy, investment ratio, log of openness and schooling, and time fixed effects. ***, **, * 
represent significance of estimates, respectively, at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 
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Appendix A: List of Countries 
 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Country 
Income 
Rank, 
1970 
Income 
Rank, 
2005 
Algeria 2 3 Greece 4 4 Pakistan 1 1 
Argentina 3 3 Guatemala 2 3 Panama 2 3 
Australia 4 4 Guyana 1 2 Papua New Guinea 1 1 
Austria 4 4 Honduras 1 2 Paraguay 1 2 
Bangladesh 1 1 Hungary 3 4 Peru 2 3 
Belgium 4 4 India 1 1 Philippines 1 1 
Bolivia 2 2 Indonesia 1 2 Portugal 3 4 
Botswana 1 3 Iran 3 3 Rwanda  1 1 
Brazil 2 3 Ireland 3 4 Senegal 1 1 
Burundi  1 1 Israel 4 4 Sierra Leone 1 1 
Cameroon 1 1 Italy 4 4 Singapore 3 4 
Canada 4 4 Jamaica 3 3 South Africa 2 3 
Central African Rep.  1 1 Jordan 2 2 Spain 4 4 
Chile 2 3 Kenya 1 1 Sri Lanka 1 2 
China 1 2 Korea, Rep. of 2 4 Sudan 1 1 
Colombia 2 3 Liberia 1 1 Sweden 4 4 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1 1 Malawi 1 1 Switzerland 4 4 
Congo, Rep. of 1 1 Malaysia 1 3 Syria 1 2 
Costa Rica 3 3 Mali 1 1 Thailand 1 3 
Cote d’Ivoire 1 1 Mauritania 1 1 Togo 1 1 
Cyprus 3 4 Mauritius 1 3 Tunisia 1 2 
Ecuador 2 3 Mexico 3 4 Turkey 2 3 
Egypt 1 2 Morocco 1 2 Uganda 1 1 
El Salvador 2 3 Mozambique 1 1 United Kingdom 4 4 
Fiji  1 2 Nepal 1 1 United States 4 4 
Finland 4 4 Netherlands 4 4 Uruguay 2 3 
France 4 4 New Zealand 4 4 Venezuela 3 3 
Gambia 1 1 Nicaragua 2 1 Zambia 1 1 
Germany 4 4 Niger 1 1 Zimbabwe 1 1 
Ghana 1 1 Norway 4 4    
 
 
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP p.c. (log) 801 8.32 1.33 4.77 10.82 
GDP per capita growth rate 796 0.02 0.03 -0.36 0.19 
Military Expenditure over GDP 778 0.028 0.028 0 0.29 
Population Growth rate 801 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.14 
Real Investment ratio 801 0.23 0.09 0.04 0.72 
Life Expectancy (log) 801 4.13 0.19 3.16 4.40 
Schooling (log) 801 1.61 0.67 -1.24 2.57 
Openness (log) 801 3.99 0.62 2.21 6.06 
Note: All descriptive statistics are based on panel country averages for the period of 1970-2010 and 89 countries sample.  
 
 
